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To compare the systems of child benefits and of family tax deductions, we create a
model with endogenous fertility and basic income, also financed from proportional wage
taxes. Pensioners are neglected but younger and older workers are distinguished: the
former raise children and receive child benefits, while the latter not. Through the
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1. Introduction
After the baby boom has petered out, below-reproduction fertility rates have become
a great problem in a number of developed countries. As a reaction, the concerned
governments have expanded fertility-related transfer schemes to support families and
promote fertility. Note that these schemes vary across time and space. In addition to
free school and health care, various financial family support systems exist. To name
just the two main types: the child benefit is increasing with the number of children
(below working age), while the family tax deduction is a child benefit which only applies
up to the income tax obligation. These fertility-related systems operate together with
an income-dependent tax system and even interact with the public pension system. In
this paper, we will create and analyze a model of optimal income- and fertility-related
transfers when fertility is endogenous. Our main message is as follows: when the past
average fertility is below 1, the partial replacement of the personal income tax by the
child benefit system increases social welfare; its replacement with family tax deduction
may diminish welfare.
To model such transfer systems, the framework of a Stackelberg-game is used: the
government announces a transfer rule, and calculating with the transfers, the work-
ers decide on their individual optima. Anticipating these reactions, the government
determines the transfer rule by maximizing a social welfare function. (Even if the gov-
ernment does not maximize any social welfare function, this technique is appropriate for
evaluating various transfer systems.) Taking into account individual and social budget
constraints calls for a general equilibrium analysis.
In models of endogenous fertility (e.g. Becker, 1960; 1991; Becker and Barro, 1988),
when workers decide on their fertility, they consider that more children means that
younger workers consume less but have more joy. As is usual, a unisex world is heroically
assumed, where the number of children can be any positive real, including the irrational
number
√
2.
The efficiency of a public pension system is proportional to the fertility, therefore
family support and pension appear as Siamese twins (e.g. Groezen, Leers and Meijdam
(2003), for short, GLM theoretically and Ga´bos, Ga´l and Ke´zdi (2009) empirically).
Nonetheless, in this paper we shall neglect the latter and try to deepen the analysis of the
former. To study the properties of a child benefit system, one can neglect income (wage)
taxation. But to analyze a family tax deduction system, one needs also model a tax
system which redistributes incomes from richer adults to poorer ones, namely provides
basic income to every adult. And then it is natural to model wage heterogeneity as well.
Unfortunately, this dimension has been much neglected in the theoretical literature on
fertility-related transfers. Making up this omission is the main aim of the present paper.
In contrast, certain applied modelers analyzed these complications in much detail but
they constructed the social welfare function to fit the real data rather than deriving the
optimum (e.g. Haan and Wrohlich, 2011).
Earlier models (e.g. GLM and Simonovits (2013), (2014)) took the per child raising
costs independent of after-tax family income: pi, while the average wage is unity. Follow-
ing Simonovits (2015a), we shall rather assume that the raising costs are proportional
to post-tax incomes: k = (z+ϕn)pi, where z is the old-age worker’s net income, ϕ is the
benefit rate and n is the fertility. For a low enough child benefit rate, low wage earners’
after tax income is much lower than 1. This modification makes the individual bud-
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get condition nonlinear in fertility, hence more complicated than its linear precursors.
Appendix B discusses the qualitative and quantitative impact of the approximation.
We even modified the framework of Simonovits (2015a): to the generation of young
workers who raise their children, we added the generation of old workers not raising
children. (Note that Pestieau and Ponthier (2015) also have two rather than one working
generation but they allow both young and old workers raise children.) That way we
have made the working period twice longer than the raising period. On the other hand,
the originally static model has become dynamic: the current fertility strongly depends
on past average fertility, causing complications.
To simplify the analysis, first a child benefit system, then a family tax deduction
system is studied. In our model, the personal income tax is simply proportional to the
wage. Direct redistribution among the adults is achieved via a uniform basic income,
while the child benefit is proportional to the number of children. For simplicity, the
young worker’s utility function is an additive logarithmic function of the young- and
the old-age consumption and of fertility (cf. GLM).
Our social welfare function is the expected value of the young workers’ maximal
lifetime utilities. (Unlike in previous models of ours, to make the optimal child benefit
positive, now there is no need to assume that the government attaches a higher pref-
erence for having children than the parents do.) Since the (pre-tax) wages, the labor
supply and the share of reported earning are given, we also fix the tax rate, and look
for the socially optimal basic income plus either the benefit rate or the tax deduction
rate. (Otherwise we could claim the social optimality of total income redistribution.
Furthermore, for a fixed tax rate, only the introduction of a basic income makes room
for a changing child benefit rate.)
We have three qualitative analytical results for the child benefit system. Corollary
and Theorem 1: the wage-specific unbalanced fertility rate is an increasing function of
the child benefit rate, a decreasing function of the basic income and again an increasing
function of the balanced child benefit rate (when the exogenously given tax covers both
the benefits and the basic income). Theorem 2: the steady-state fertility is an increasing
function of the balanced child benefit rate. Theorem 3: for any past average fertility
rate below 1, a low enough benefit is better than no benefit.
Turning to the family tax deduction system and confining the examination to two
types (with low and high wages), the optimal tax deduction rate is a corner solution,
where the tax obligation of the low-paid worker just equals the tax deduction. On the
one hand, if the tax rate is high, the wage distribution is modestly unequal and the past
average fertility is high, then the benefit system is more efficient than the deduction
system is. Then even the pure basic income system may overtake the deduction system.
On the other hand, if the tax rate is low, the wage distribution is very unequal and
the past average fertility is low, then the opposite holds. It is to be underlined that in
practice, the family tax deduction system may be very far from this optimum, because
the personal income tax rate is so low that only the high earners can use the deduction
sufficiently. Though the model is rather theoretical, we have to support our incomplete
analytical results with numerical illustrations.
We call the reader’s attention to our model’s limitations within the theoretical field:
sterility is neglected (for asymmetric information, see Cremer, Gahvari and Pestieau,
2008), the labor supply is fixed (for flexible labor, see Fenge and Meier, 2009) and differ-
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ences in the relative raising costs and the utility functions, especially in the parameter
of relative utility of a child are glossed over (cf. Simonovits, 2013 and 2014). The role
of social norms are also neglected (for its analytical treatment, see e.g. Lindbeck, Ny-
berg and Weibull (1999). For a rich empirical discussion of these issues in developing
countries, see Banerjee and Duflo (2011), Chapter 5). The activities occurring outside
the market are especially important in raising children (e.g. Lee and Mason eds. (2011)
and Ga´l, Szabo´ and Vargha, 2014) but they are also skipped over. Murphy (2006) ap-
plied agent-based modeling to investigate the role of assortative mating on population
growth. Further research will clarify how much the message of the paper changes if
these complexities are taken into account.
The remainder is organized as follows: Section 2 investigates the minimal model of
child benefits. Section 3 discusses a similar model of family tax deduction. Section 4
numerically checks the robustness of our results and Section 5 concludes. Proofs are
relegated to Appendix A and an accepted approximation is analyzed in Appendix B.
2. Child benefit system
The numbers appearing in the paper are generally positive real ones. In this section, first
we shall determine the individually optimal fertility under child benefits, then deduce
the macro relations and finally illustrate the results numerically.
Individually optimal fertility
In our model, there is a unisex population, where young workers give birth to children,
raise them, together with old workers they pay taxes to finance child benefits and a
universal basic income. For simplicity, there is neither saving nor discounting.
Every young worker in our population is characterized by her pre-tax wage w which is
preserved for old age. The wages are distributed according to a probability distribution
function F and the distribution defines a corresponding expectation operator E. Any
young worker can freely choose the number of her children, denoted by n. The transfer
system has two objectives: (i) to diminish pre-tax wage inequalities and (ii) to finance
a part of the raising costs. Every worker receives a basic income γ. A worker, earning
wage w pays tax θw, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. A young worker, who has n children, also receives child
benefits ϕn, ϕ > 0 being the child benefit rate.
Denoting the net-of-tax rate by θˆ = 1− θ, the old worker’s net income is equal to
z = θˆw + γ (1a)
and the young worker’s net income is
z + ϕn. (1b)
We assume that the raising cost is proportional to the number of children and the
net income. Denoting the proportionality constant by pi > 0, the raising cost is equal
to pin(z+ϕn), therefore the old and young worker’s consumption are respectively given
by
d = z (2a)
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and
c = (1− pin)(z + ϕn), where 0 < n < 1
pi
. (2b)
To avoid absurd cases, we assume that the child benefit is always nonnegative and not
greater than the narrow raising cost: 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ pizm, where zm = θˆwm + γ.
Assume that any young worker chooses her fertility to maximize an additive loga-
rithmic utility function
U(c, n, d) = log c+ ζ log n+ log d, (3)
where ζ > 0 is the relative individual utility of having children with respect to that of
adult consumption.
Inserting (2) into (3) yields the reduced utility function
u(n) = log(z + ϕn) + log(1− pin) + ζ log n+ log z. (4)
We assume that the workers neglect the impact of their decisions on the tax balance
described in (9) below.
Equating u′s derivative to zero provides the young worker’s necessary optimality
condition:
0 = u′(n) =
ϕ
z + ϕn
− pi
1− pin +
ζ
n
. (5)
Since u′(n) is a decreasing function and u(0) = −∞, the root is a global maximum.
At this point we shall consider the simplest case when there is no child benefit.
Example 1. If there is no child benefit: ϕ = 0, then the balance condition [(9)
below] is simply θ = γ. The introduction of a pure basic income has no fertility effect,
because the optimal fertility is independent of the net income z:
n0 = n(w, 0, θ) =
ζ
ζ¯pi
. (6o)
Then the young worker’s consumption is equal to c0 = z/ζ¯, independently of the per-
child raising cost pi. We are especially interested in cases, where the fertility is below 1,
therefore we shall assume n0 < 1, i.e. pi > ζ/ζ¯.
Returning to the general case of ϕ > 0, we present the explicit solution of the
wage-specific fertility.
Lemma 1. In a(n unbalanced) transfer system with basic income γ and child
benefit rate ϕ, the optimal fertility of a young worker with a narrow income z = θˆw+ γ
is the positive root of the quadratic equation
E(n,w, ϕ, γ) = (2 + ζ)piϕn2 + ζ¯(piz − ϕ)n− ζz = 0, where ζ¯ = 1 + ζ, (6)
namely
n(w,ϕ, γ) =
−B +√B2 + 4AC
2A
, (7)
where
A = (2 + ζ)piϕ, B = ζ¯(piz − ϕ) and C = ζz. (8)
Though formulas (7)–(8) are helpful in the numerical calculations, their analytical
use is very limited. In contrast, (5) is very useful, implying
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Corollary. The individual optimal fertility is an increasing function of the child
benefit rate ϕ > 0, a decreasing function of the wage w > 0 and of the basic income
γ > 0. The higher the wage, the weaker is the impact of the rise in the transfer rates ϕ
and γ.
Indeed, consider the optimality condition (5) and increase ϕ, then the declining
curve shifts to the right, leading to a higher n(w,ϕ, γ). The opposite holds for w and
γ. The higher the w, the higher is z, thus the lower is the right hand side of (5).
Macrorelations
Having finished the individual analysis, we consider the whole population with a given
wage distribution and assume that the average wage is Ew = 1, regardless of age. We
have four overlapping generations, where N denotes the size of generation born in the
current period and N−i denotes that of last but i period, i = 1, 2, 3. Then the current
and past average fertilities are equal ν = En = N/N−1 and ν−1 = En−1 = N−1/N−2,
respectively. Since pensioners are neglected, N−3 is irrelevant.
We shall now discuss the balance condition of the tax system in the current period.
On average, the tax is the sum of the child benefit and the basic income, the former
being the product of the child benefit rate and the number of children. Hence
(N−1 +N−2)θ = ϕN + (N−1 +N−2)γ. (9)
Using definitions N−1 = ν−1N−2 and N = νν−1N−2, (9) simplifies to the balance
equation
(1 + ν−1−1)(θ − γ) = ϕν(ϕ, γ), (9′)
where ν(ϕ, γ) = En(w,ϕ, γ) is the average current fertility as a function of the child
benefit rate ϕ and the basic income γ, ν−1−1 = 1/ν−1 is sometimes suppressed.
Before presenting the involved analysis, we discuss another very simple special case.
Example 2. Assume homogeneous wages: w ≡ 1, and exclude basic income: γ = 0,
hence z = 1 − θ. To simplify the calculations, we are looking for the stationary case
n = 1, when the balance condition (9′) reduces to ϕ = 2θ. Substituting into (6) directly:
E(1, 1, 2θ, 0) = 2(2 + ζ)piθ + ζ¯(pi(1− θ)− 2θ)− ζ(1− θ) = 0.
By simple calculation, the corresponding tax rate is given by
θ1 =
ζ¯pi − ζ
2 + ζ − (3 + ζ)pi ∈ (0, 1) if
ζ
1 + ζ
< pi <
1 + ζ
2 + ζ
.
We return now to the general problem. For a fixed tax rate θ, a child benefit rate ϕ
and a past average fertility rate ν−1, one has to substitute (7)–(8) into (9′), and solve
the resulting implicit equation for γ[ϕ, ν−1] called balanced basic income:
(1 + ν−1−1)(θ − γ[ϕ, ν−1]) = ϕν(ϕ, γ[ϕ, ν−1]). (9′′)
We are looking for the conditions guaranteeing the existence and uniqueness of the
balanced income, moreover γ[ϕ, ν−1] is decreasing in ϕ. Proofs are given in Appendix
A.
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Theorem 1. Fix the past average fertility ν−1 and let ϕm be a positive real number
such that
(1 + ν−1−1)θ > ϕν(ϕ, 0) (10a)
and
−ϕν′γ(ϕ, γ) < 1 + ν−1−1 , γ < θ (10b)
hold for 0 < ϕ < ϕm. Then the balanced basic income γ[ϕ, ν−1] exists, is unique and
decreasing in ϕ; the average fertility ν(ϕ, γ[ϕ, ν−1]) is increasing in ϕ.
Remark. Condition (10a) is simple because the right hand side is an increasing
function of ϕ. Condition (10b) is more complex, because the positive number on the
left hand side looks much lower than the right hand side but we are not sure if this is
an effective bound or not.
We can now formulate the fertility dynamics:
ν[ϕ, ν−1] =
(1 + ν−1−1)(θ − γ[ϕ, ν−1])
ϕ
, ϕ > 0. (9′′′)
Note that this relation is essentially independent of the utility function, only the form
of γ[ϕ, ν−1] depends on the optimization framework.
Under certain (unexplored) conditions and for a given child benefit rate ϕ, there
exists a unique (balanced) steady-state (average) fertility νo which satisfies
θ = ϕ
νo2
νo + 1
+ γ[ϕ, νo], (9o)
where
νo = En[w,ϕ, νo].
We prove now the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Assuming that there exists a unique steady-state fertility, it is an
increasing function of the child benefit rate.
Remark. For any feasible child benefit rate, we conjecture that the fertility dy-
namics (9′′′) converges very fast to the steady state. The local convergence speed is the
reciprocal of the contraction factor |H ′(νo)|. The fast convergence is obvious for ϕ = 0,
when the dynamics steers fertility to the steady state n0 in just one period, regardless
of the initial fertility ν−1. Our numerical experiments support this hypothesis for ϕ > 0
as well.
To choose the socially optimal child benefit system, the government maximizes a
utilitarian social welfare function:
V [ϕ] = E {log c[w,ϕ] + ζ log n[w,ϕ] + log d[w,ϕ]} . (11)
We shall prove that some positive child benefit is socially useful, at least if the past
average fertility rate was below 1. (For ν−1 ≥ 1, ϕ∗ = 0.)
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Theorem 3. For any given past average fertility rate ν−1 < 1, the socially optimal
balanced child benefit rate is positive: ϕ∗ > 0.
As is usual, to compare the two systems—basic income combined with child benefits
and pure basic income—from a welfare point of view, we introduce the following concept:
the relative efficiency ε of the combined system with respect to the pure basic income
is equal to that positive real number, multiplying the wages of the no-benefit system by
it, the welfare is equal to that of the benefit system with the original wages. Adding
an argument for the average wage ε in the social welfare function, the corresponding
equation for efficiency is
V (1, ϕ) = V (ε, 0).
Due to the special structure of the utility and the social welfare functions,
V (ε, 0) = V (1, 0) + 2 log ε, i.e. ε = exp([V (1, ϕ)− V (1, 0)]/2). (12)
Numerical illustrations: base run
To help the understanding of the steady state’s and the welfare function’s behavior,
we shall display numerically the dependence of the optimal outcomes on the balanced
transfer rates. In the base run, we have only two types, in the base run with earnings
wL = 0.5 and wH = 2, with a common relative raising cost pi = 0.35 and population
shares fL = 2/3, fH = 1 − fL = 1/3. We fix the value of the tax rate at θ = 0.3 and
the preference parameter at ζ = 0.4. Note that this choice satisfies the condition set in
Example 2: 0.286 < 0.35 < 0.59. For ϕ = 0, γ = θ and nL = nH = n0 hold (Example
1).
In Table 1 we display the dependence of the balanced basic income and the steady
state fertility as a function of the child benefit rate. Note that in reality, the pure child
benefit rate is very low, in Hungary, about 2% of the average total wage cost. But
including hidden transfers like free schooling and health care, this rate can be much
higher. As the benefit rate rises from 0 to 0.16 (close to the maximum), the balanced
basic income drops from 0.3 to 0.225 and the steady-state fertility rises from n0 = 0.816
to 1.051.
Table 1. Child benefit rate and steady-state fertility
Child benefit Balanced Steady-state
rate basic income fertility
ϕ γ[ϕ, νo] νo
0 0.300 0.816
0.04 0.284 0.876
0.08 0.267 0.936
0.12 0.247 0.995
0.16 0.225 1.051
Remark. wL = 1/2, fL = 2/3, θ = 0.3.
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Moving from the steady state analysis to the dynamic one, we should pay attention
to the influence of past average fertility. Creating Table 2 we fix the past average fertility
rate, namely below 1: close to n0, ν−1 = 0.8. As the child benefit rate increases, the
relative efficiency increases less and less and reaches the maximum around ϕ∗ = 0.06.
Increasing ϕ until it almost covers the raising cost of the lower paid type, the fertility of
the lower paid increases much faster than the higher paid’s: nL = 1.127 > 0.939 = nH .
Note, however, that the social welfare slowly sinks, and from ϕ = 0.12 it drops below
the no-benefit level.
Table 2. Impact of the child benefit rate
Child Balanced F e r t i l i t y
benefit basic Low High Relative
rate income w a g e Average efficiency
ϕ γ[ϕ, ν−1] nL nH ν ε
0.00 0.300 0.816 0.816 0.816 1.000
0.06 0.276 0.929 0.859 0.906 1.002
0.12 0.247 1.041 0.902 0.995 1.000
0.17 0.220 1.127 0.939 1.065 0.995
Remark. See Table 1, ν−1 = 0.8.
3. Family tax deduction system
There are governments which are worried by the large transfers flowing from high-earner
workers (families) to low-earner ones through child benefits. To mitigate this unwanted
consequence, these governments replace child benefits by family tax deductions. (It
is possible to model a partial replacement but it would unnecessarily complicate the
analysis.) The essence of the family tax deduction is that only the higher wage types
can fully use it: any positive excess transfer e = ϕn(w)− θw is eliminated.
The simplest formulation of the family tax deduction is as follows. Let ψ > 0 be the
child tax deduction rate, i.e. having n children, amount ψn can be deducted from the
proportional personal income tax θw, up to the maximum θw. To avoid absurd cases,
we assume that the family tax deduction is always lower than or equal to the narrow
raising cost: ψ ≤ pizm, where zm corresponds to the minimal wage wm. Let t0 denote
now the tax deducted: t0 = min(θw, ψn). Obviously, if the benefit is so low or the
tax rate is so high that even the minimal wage earner’s tax amount is higher than the
family tax deduction, then the latter reduces to the child benefit. But this has already
been covered in Section 3, therefore we assume that θwm ≤ ψn.
By definition, type w’s old-age consumption is equal to d = z, while its own young-
age consumption is equal to
c = (z + t0)(1− pin) (13)
We have now two domains in the parameter space (w, θ, ϕ, γ) ∈ R4+; slack, denoted
by S: θwS > ψnS and tight, denoted by T: θwT ≤ ψnT. (The status of the demarcation
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line θw = ψn is ambiguous.) Correspondingly, t0S = ψn and t0T = θw. Then (13)
branches off into
cS = (zS + ψnS)(1− pinS), zS = θˆwS + γ (13S)
and
cT = (wT + γ)(1− pinT), zT = θˆwT + γ. (13T )
Then there are two separate regimes with their own fertility optima. Lemma 1
provides nS for ψ replacing ϕ in (7)–(8), while nT for ϕ = 0 and θ = 0, i.e. (6o). It can
be shown that nS(w,ψ, γ) > nT. It is especially disturbing that the transition from S
into T is discontinuous: the optimal transfer drops a lot due to a minor tax rate rise!
To formulate the new balance condition, we repeat the argument leading to (9).
But now we take into account the partition along S–T, which depends on the parameter
vector (w,ψ, γ). For convenience, we assume that the relevant functions nS(w,ψ, γ) and
nT(w,ψ, γ) are also defined outside their natural domains, being equal to zero outside
their proper domains. Subindexes S and T refer to these restricted expectations. The
reformulated balance equation (cf. (9′)) is as follows:
(1 + ν−1−1)(θ − γ) = ψESnS(w,ψ, γ) + θETw. (14)
Our social welfare function remains basically the same as above, only ψ replaces ϕ.
Due to its simplicity, it is worth discussing the two-type case of family tax deduction.
Example 3. In the two-type case, the low-wage type is tight, the high-wage type
is slack. Furthermore, at the social optimum, the low wage type’s family tax deduction
is equal to her tax: ψ∗nL = θwL. Inserting (6o), our optimality condition becomes
ψ∗ =
ζ¯piθwL
ζ
. (15)
Substituting (15) into (14) and using (7)–(8) yield an equation for γ[ψ∗, ν−1].
It is easy to grasp that in general the optimal family tax deduction system is far
from being socially optimal. Due to the elimination of the excess transfer, the low-
wage type’s fertility is as low as n0 in (6o) and the corresponding net income is only
yL = wL + γ, which is lower than in the pure basic income system: yoL = θˆwL + θ. The
high-wage type’s fertility is higher than n0 but the additional resource brings less gain
in her consumption and child welfare than the loss is in the low-wage type’s welfare.
We continue the numerical illustrations. For θ = 0.3, the optimal tax deduction rate
is ψ∗ = 0.184 and the corresponding basic income γ∗ = 0.230. The fertility rates are
respectively nL = 0.816, nH = 0.948 and ν = 0.860. The relative efficiency is ε = 1.002,
just the same as the child benefit system’s.
4. Check of robustness
In this Section we shall check the robustness of our numerical results. We also add a new
indicator to be called the double weighted fertility: νw = E(wn(w)), where the wage
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dependent fertilities n(w) are also weighted by the parents earnings, approximating the
average quality of children.
Creating Tables 3a and b, the fertility and the consumption outcomes of the socially
optimal child benefit system reported separately. We shall raise the low wage from 0.5
to 0.75 and independently, diminish the low earners’ frequency from 2/3 to 1/3. Note
that for given frequencies, the high wage changes according to wH = (1−fLwL)/fH . On
the other hand, if the wages are given, wL < 1 < wH , then the corresponding frequency
is determined as fL = (wH − 1)/(wH −wL). To help the reader, we shall display fL in
Tables 3a–4a, and wH in Tables 3b–4b.
It may be surprising that the socially optimal benefit rate and the balanced basic
income are insensitive to the wage and frequency distribution, they are around 0.07 and
0.27, respectively. The same invariance applies to the average fertility (around 0.91),
the wage-weighted fertility (around 0.89) and the relative efficiency (around 1.003–
1.004). We shall see in Appendix B that in the approximation, this invariance of average
fertility is exact. The efficiency gain may seem to be modest, it is usual in such welfare
calculations. The only noticeable change occurs within the fertilities: the lower wage
earners’ fertility varies between 0.92 to 0.95, while the higher wage earners’ fertility
varies between 0.86 and 0.90.
Table 3a. Optimal child benefits for varying wages and frequencies: fertilities
LE Child Balanced F e r t i l i t y Double
Low fre- benefits basic Low High Relative weighted
wage quency rate income w a g e Average efficiency fertility
wL fL ϕ
∗ γ[ϕ∗, ν−1] nL nH ν ε νw
0.50 0.667 0.065 0.274 0.938 0.863 0.913 1.002 0.888
0.500 0.068 0.273 0.944 0.877 0.911 1.002 0.894
0.333 0.071 0.271 0.950 0.890 0.910 1.002 0.900
0.75 0.667 0.070 0.272 0.920 0.879 0.906 1.002 0.899
0.500 0.071 0.272 0.921 0.890 0.905 1.002 0.902
0.333 0.072 0.271 0.923 0.897 0.905 1.002 0.903
Remark. LE = low earner, ν−1 = 0.8, θ = 0.3
Turning to the details of consumption, Table 3b shows that as wL and wH change,
the low earners’ consumption at young and old ages increase. Note that the high earners’
old-age incomes and the lifetime utilities decrease when fL drops or wL rises, since wH
drops.
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Table 3b. Optimal child benefits for varying wages and frequencies: consumption
L o w e a r n e r s ’ H i g h e a r n e r s ’
younger older younger older
wage c o n s u m p t i o n wage c o n s u m p t i o n
wL cL dL wH cH dH
0.5 0.460 0.624 2.000 1.208 1.674
0.623 1.500 0.958 1.323
0.621 1.250 0.833 1.146
0.75 0.584 0.797 1.500 0.958 1.322
0.797 1.250 0.833 1.147
0.796 1.125 0.771 1.059
Remark. Table 3a
Turning to the socially optimal family tax deduction system, Tables 4a and b are
more varied. By (15), the optimal tax deduction rate ψ∗ rises with wL, from 0.184 to
0.276. The low-earners’ fertility rate now stagnates at nL = n0, while the high earners’
fertility rises from nH = 0.948 (at wL = 0.5 and fL = 2/3) to 1.117 (at wL = 0.75
and fL = 1/3). The average fertility also increases, but note that at transition from
wL = 0.5 and fL = 1/3 to wL = 0.75 and fL = 2/3, the average fertility drops from
0.94 to 0.9. The relative efficiency is sinking from 1.004 to 0.992.
Table 4a. Optimal family tax deductions for varying wages and frequency: fert
Tax
LE’s deduc- Balanced F e r t i l i t y Double
Low fre- tion basic Low High Relative weighted
wage quency rate income w a g e Average efficiency fertility
wL fL ψ
∗ γ[ψ∗, ν−1] nL nH ν ε νw
0.50 0.667 0.184 0.230 0.816 0.948 0.860 1.002 0.904
0.500 0.227 0.982 0.899 1.000 0.941
0.333 0.223 1.007 0.943 0.999 0.975
0.75 0.667 0.276 0.190 0.816 1.061 0.898 0.999 0.939
0.500 0.183 1.096 0.956 0.995 0.991
0.333 0.175 1.117 1.017 0.992 1.042
Turning to the details of consumption, a similar picture emerges as in Table 3b
but the dropping frequency fL slightly decreases the low earners’ consumption at both
ages. Note that the younger age consumption dramatically increases, while the old-
age consumption dramatically decreases with respect to the benefit system. Their sum
changes from 1.08 to 1.1 but is less diverse (in the basic run). Turning to high earners,
the total consumption decreases from 2.882 to 2.835 (also in the basic run) but the
much higher fertility compensates for this drop. We must admit that it is not easy to
understand the welfare differences between the two systems.
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Table 4b. Optimal family tax deductions for varying wages and frequencies: cons
L o w e a r n e r s ’ H i g h e a r n e r s ’
younger older younger older
wage c o n s u m p t i o n wage c o n s u m p t i o n
wL cL dL wH cH dH
0.5 0.521 0.580 2.000 1.205 1.630
0.519 0.577 1.500 0.956 1.277
0.516 0.573 1.250 0.831 1.098
0.75 0.671 0.715 1.500 0.963 1.240
0.666 0.708 1.250 0.838 1.058
0.661 0.700 1.125 0.774 0.963
Until now, we have fixed the tax rate at θ = 0.3. If we change its value between 0
and 0.5, and compare the two systems, we get Tables 5 and 6.
Starting with the child benefit systems, in Table 4 we see the same invariance as
before in Table 3. The difference between the tax rate and the basic income is roughly
constant, approximately 0.024. (Note that in the approximation used in Appendix B,
this difference is exactly constant.) The relative efficiency is above that of the pure tax
system by 0.2%. A surprising phenomenon occurs in the interval of unrealistically low
the tax rates [0, 0.06]: while θ rises, the low earners’ fertility jumps from 0.816 to 0.95,
the high earners’ fertility nH rises from 0.816 to 0.854; the optimal child benefit rate
reaches 0.06 and the relative efficiency stabilizes around 1.004.
Table 5. The impact of the tax rate on optimal benefits
Child Balanced F e r t i l i t y Double
Tax benefit basic Low High Relative weighted
rate rate income w a g e Average efficiency fertility
θ ϕ∗ γ[ϕ∗, ν−1] nL nH ν ε νw
0.0 0.000 0.000 0.816 0.816 0.816 1.000 0.816
0.1 0.059 0.076 0.947 0.854 0.916 1.002 0.885
0.2 0.062 0.175 0.943 0.858 0.914 1.002 0.886
0.3 0.065 0.274 0.938 0.863 0.913 1.002 0.888
0.4 0.067 0.373 0.933 0.867 0.911 1.002 0.889
0.5 0.068 0.473 0.927 0.871 0.908 1.002 0.890
Remark. wL = 2/3 and fL = 2/3.
Continuing with the tax deduction system, we see that the difference θ−ψ∗ increases
from 0.023 to 0.122. In 0.1 ≤ θ < 0.3, its relative efficiency is higher; in 0.3 < θ ≤ 0.5,
its relative efficiency is lower than the benefit system’s. Even if the consumption data
were shown as in Tables 3b–4b, it would be difficult to understand the relation between
two sums of six terms.
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Table 6. The impact of the tax rate on optimal deductions
Tax Balanced F e r t i l i t y Double
Tax deduction basic Low High Relative weighted
rate rate income w a g e Average efficiency fertility
θ ψ∗ γ[ψ∗, ν−1] nL nH ν ε νw
0.1 0.061 0.077 0.816 0.855 0.829 1.003 0.842
0.2 0.123 0.154 0.899 0.844 1.003 0.871
0.3 0.184 0.230 0.948 0.860 1.002 0.904
0.4 0.245 0.304 1.002 0.878 1.000 0.940
0.5 0.306 0.378 1.061 0.898 0.996 0.980
Remark. see Table 5
Finally we illustrate the impact of the past average fertility on the two optima, fixing
the tax rate at θ = 0.3. Table 7 displays the important outcomes while ν−1 changes
between 0.7 and 0.9. The most important impact concerns the optimal child benefit
rate and the basic income: the first drops from 0.118 to 0.028, while the second rises
from 0.252 to 0.289. As a result, all the four fertilities decrease, namely the average one
from 0.991 to 0.858. Here are the details.
Table 7. The impact of the past average fertility on optimal benefits
Past Child Balanced F e r t i l i t y Double
average benefit basic Low High Relative weighted
fertility rate income w a g e Average efficiency fertility
ν−1 ϕ∗ γ[ψ∗, ν−1] nL nH ν ε νw
0.70 0.118 0.252 1.036 0.901 0.991 1.005 0.946
0.75 0.088 0.265 0.981 0.879 0.947 1.003 0.913
0.80 0.065 0.274 0.938 0.863 0.913 1.002 0.888
0.85 0.045 0.282 0.901 0.848 0.883 1.001 0.866
0.90 0.028 0.289 0.868 0.836 0.858 1.000 0.847
Remark. See Table 1.
Repeating this calculation for the family tax deduction, the change is mainly limited
to basic income, which drops from 0.235 to 0.225. As a consequence, the relative
efficiency drops from 1.009 to 0.996. Note that for low past average fertility, this is
much higher than the child benefit optimum, and for high past average fertility, it is
much lower.
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5. Conclusions
In our very simple model, we studied the interaction of the personal income tax and
fertility-related transfers. We studied analytically the socially optimal child benefit
and the family tax deduction systems. At least in our arbitrary numerical examples,
the socially optimal child benefit system’s efficiency is constant, while the family tax
deduction system’s efficiency sensitively depends on the parameter values of the tax
rate and the wage distribution. Counterintuitively, on the one hand, if the tax rate is
high and the wage distribution is modestly unequal, than the benefit system is more
efficient than the deduction system is. Then even the pure basic income system may
overtake the deduction system. On the other hand, if the tax rate is low and the wage
distribution is very unequal, than the opposite holds. It is to be underlined that in
practice, the family tax deduction system may be very far from this optimum, when
the personal income tax rate is so low that only the high earners can use the deduction
sufficiently.
We warn the reader on the limits of the model. We used the simplest utility function
pair, two logarithmic functions. Even at the modest generalization into CRRA (see, e.g.
Greenwood, Sheshadri and Vandenbroucke, 2005), the independence of the fertility of
the wage in Example 1 (no child benefit) disappears, therefore the saving of Theorems
1 and 2 requires further nontrivial assumptions. The neglect of the negative impact of
taxation on labor supply and tax reporting further weakens the force of our numerical
examples. The inclusion of labor disutility and flexible labor supply or tax morale and
underreporting would make the model more realistic and determine the optimal tax
rate, would more fully highlight the differences between the two transfer systems. But
these modifications would further complicate the analysis, therefore we have not used
them here. The heterogeneity of the relative raising cost also deserves an examination.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1
Define the balance of the transfer system as
D(ϕ, γ, ν−1) = (1 + ν−1−1)(θ − γ)− ϕν(ϕ, γ)
and consider it as a function of the second variable γ. Since
D(ϕ, 0, ν−1) = (1 + ν−1−1)θ − ϕν(ϕ, 0) > 0 > D(ϕ, θ, ν−1) = −ϕν(ϕ, θ),
therefore, by Bolzano-theorem, there exists at least one root for D(ϕ, γ, ν−1) = 0.
To prove uniqueness, note that by our second assumption,
D′γ(ϕ, γ, ν−1) = −(1 + ν−1−1)− ϕν′γ(ϕ, γ) < 0 for 0 < ϕ < ϕm.
We shall also need
D′ϕ(ϕ, γ, ν−1) = −ν(ϕ, γ)− ϕν′ϕ(ϕ, γ) < 0
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(see Corollary for ν′ϕ > 0).
Using the implicit function theorem,
γ′[ϕ] = −D
′
ϕ
D′γ
< 0.
Turning to the balanced fertility–benefit rate schedule, take the total derivative of
ν(ϕ, γ[ϕ, ν−1], ν−1) by ϕ:
d
dϕ
ν(ϕ, γ[ϕ, ν−1]) = ν′ϕ + ν
′
γγ
′
ϕ[ϕ, ν−1],
where ν′ϕ > 0 > ν
′
γ , thus the total derivative is positive.
Proof of Theorem 2
We shall rely on the implicit function theorem again. Dropping the superscript o,
introduce notation
G(ϕ, ν) = ϕ
ν2
ν + 1
+ γ[ϕ, ν].
Taking the partial derivatives
G′ϕ =
ν2
ν + 1
+ γ′ϕ[ϕ, ν] and G
′
ν = ϕ
ν2 + 2ν
(ν + 1)2
+ γ′ν [ϕ, ν].
By Theorem 1,
γ′ϕ[ϕ, ν] <
ν2
ν2 + 1
.
We shall demonstrate that γ′ν [ϕ, ν] > 0.
Returning to D(ϕ, γ, ν−1), γ′ν [ϕ, ν] = −D′γ/D′ν−1 , where Dγ < 0 by assumption. A
simple calculation yields
D′ν−1 = (θ − γ)− ϕν(ϕ, γ).
Comparing it to D = 0, yields D′ν−1 > 0. Therefore G
′
ϕ < 0 < G′ν , i.e. ν′(ϕ) =
−G′ϕ/G′ν > 0.
Proof of Theorem 3
The existence of the social optima is obvious. The basic idea is borrowed from the well-
known proof of the envelope-theorem. We shall show V ′[0] > 0. Taking the derivative
of V in (11) with respect to ϕ and using (1b) yield
V ′[ϕ] = E
z′ϕ[w,ϕ] + n[w,ϕ] + ϕn
′
ϕ[w,ϕ]
z[w,ϕ] + ϕn[w,ϕ]
−E pin
′
ϕ[w,ϕ]
1− pin[w,ϕ] + ζE
n′ϕ[w,ϕ]
n[w,ϕ]
+E
z′ϕ[w,ϕ]
z[w,ϕ]
.
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Using the individual optimality condition (5), multiplying it by n′ϕ[w,ϕ] and applying
z′ϕ[w,ϕ] = γ′[ϕ] [(1a)], we obtain
V ′[ϕ] = E
γ′[ϕ] + n[w,ϕ]
z[w,ϕ] + ϕn[w,ϕ]
+E
γ′[ϕ]
z[w,ϕ]
.
For ϕ = 0, n[w, 0] = n0, the common denominator is z[w, 0] and the wage-dependent
numerator of V ′(0) is a constant:
2γ′[0] + n0 = n0 − 2 ν−1
ν−1 + 1
n0 =
1− ν−1
ν−1 + 1
n0.
Therefore V ′[0] > 0 if and only if ν−1 < 1.
Appendix B: Approximation of raising costs
In this Appendix, we shall discuss an approximation of the raising costs, used in the
literature. On the one hand, this simplification opens more room for analytical calcula-
tions and enables us to prove directly some of our theorems above. On the other hand,
it distorts the analysis, causing qualitative and quantitative errors.
Earlier papers (GLM and Simonovits, 2013, 2014) made the raising costs indepen-
dent of the net income: (pi − ϕ)n, implying young workers’ consumption
c = z − (pi − ϕ)n. (B.1)
Due to (B.1),
u(n) = log(z − (pi − ϕ)n) + ζ logn+ log z, (B.2)
therefore the optimal wage-specific fertility is
n(w,ϕ, γ) =
ζz
ζ¯(pi − ϕ) . (B.3)
Note that contrary to Corollary to Lemma 1, the unbalanced fertility is an increasing
rather than decreasing function of the wage and the basic income! Taking the expec-
tations on n(w,ϕ, γ) in (B.3), and using z = θˆw + γ, i.e. Ez = θˆ + γ, i.e. the current
average fertility is given by
ν(ϕ, γ) =
ζ(θˆ + γ)
ζ¯(pi − ϕ) . (B.4)
Making a short detour, we remark that the aggregate fertility is now independent of
the wage distribution!
In a better approximation, the per child raising costs are not independent of but
proportional to the narrow net income, implying
c = z − (piz − ϕ)n. (B.1′)
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This modification would preserve the linearity but the resulting
n(w,ϕ, γ) =
ζz
ζ¯(piz − ϕ) (B.3
′)
would make the average fertility dependent on the wage distribution, preventing simple
aggregation.
Rather than determining the balanced basic income, we introduce the difference
between the tax rate and the basic income: λ = θ − γ (i.e. γ = θ − λ). This is the
part of the tax which finances the child benefits, shortly: earmarked child tax rate. To
shorten (B.4), we introduce notation ω = ζ/[ζ¯(pi − ϕ)], yielding
ν(ϕ, θ − λ) = (1− λ)ω. (B.5)
(Note that for ϕ = 0, ω = n0.) Substitute (B.5) into the balance equation (9′):
(1 + ν−1−1)λ = ωϕ(1− λ),
hence the balanced earmarked child tax rate is equal to
λ[ϕ, ν−1] =
ωϕ
1 + ωϕ+ ν−1−1
.
Note that the balanced earmarked tax rate is independent of the tax rate and is an
increasing function of the child benefit rate. Therefore the balanced basic income is a
decreasing function of the child benefit rate and any increase in the tax rate increases
the income by the same quantity.
Returning to (B.5) yields a simple fertility dynamics:
ν =
ω(1 + ν−1−1)
1 + ωϕ+ ν−1−1
i.e.
ν = H(ν−1) =
ω(1 + ν−1)
1 + (1 + ωϕ)ν−1
. (B.6)
To obtain the steady state, we substitute ν = ν−1 into (B.6). The resulting quadratic
equation
(1 + ωϕ)ν2 + (ω − 1)ν − ω = 0
yields the positive root
νo =
ω − 1 +√(ω + 1)2 + 4ω2ϕ
2(1 + ωϕ)
. (B.7)
Finally we could check the local stability under (B.6). As is well-known, the dynam-
ics is locally stable if |H ′(νo)| < 1 holds. A simple calculation yields the condition of
local stability:
|H ′(νo)| = ω
2ϕ
[1 + (1 + ω + ϕ)νo]2
< 1. (B.8)
By geometric reasoning it could be proved that local stability here implies global sta-
bility.
In summary, we proved
17
Theorem B.1. In approximation (B.1), the balanced steady-state average fertility
is determined by (B.7) and it is locally (and globally) stable if (B.8) holds.
We have tried to give a quite general and plausible condition for (B.8) to hold but
we must be satisfied with numerical simulations presented in Table B.1. We display the
dependence of the approximated steady state fertility as a function of the child benefit
rate. As the benefit rate rises from 0 to 0.08, the balanced basic income drops from
0.3 to 0.259 (the exact value is equal to 0.267 in Table 1) and the steady-state fertility
rises from n0 = 0.816 to 1.015 (the exact value is equal to 0.936). The approximation
is hardly acceptable.
Table B.1. Child benefit rate and steady-state fertility: approximation
Child benefit Balanced Steady-state Contraction
rate basic income fertility factor
ϕ γ[ϕ, νo] νo |H ′(νo)|
0 0.300 0.816 0
0.04 0.283 0.906 0.009
0.08 0.259 1.015 0.020
0.12 0.226 1.150 0.034
0.16 0.180 1.323 0.052
Remark. See Table 1.
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